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The Primacy of Political Actors in
Accommodation of Religion
William K. Kelley*
In dealing with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,' judges and
commentators have gone to great lengths, to put it mildly, to discern governing
standards that are true to the text and history of the Constitution, the traditions
and history of the people, and the principles the Clauses are thought to reflect.
This paper is about the judicial role in an important category of cases
implicating the Religion Clauses, those controversies arising from what is
commonly called "accommodation of religion." Sometimes governmental
actors in the political branches (either state or federal) engage in conduct
which takes account of, or accommodates, the religious sensibilities of some
citizens. Accommodation of religion raises fundamental questions regarding
the role of religious freedom in American society and the limits on the
government's power to take action to maximize the room for religion to
flourish without compromising principles barring excessive governmental
involvement with or advancement of religion.
My argument is that the Court's conduct in cases raising questions of
accommodation reflects great suspicion of legislative (or political) power and
great faith in judicial power. That attitude, however, has things generally
backwards - there is less reason for suspicion of majoritarian institutions when
those institutions are acting to protect minority sensibilities, especially in a
way that visits no real world harm on those religious believers whose interests
are not directly at stake. In such contexts, the Court is no better situated than
non-judicial political actors to draw the constitutional lines. And it would do
well to recognize that non-judicial actors are able - and indeed are required by
their constitutional oaths - to reach sound constitutional judgments about the
appropriate scope of accommodations of religion in American life.
Before turning to my analysis, it is important to be clear about what the
article is not about, and why. First, my argument does not depend on the
correctness or acceptance of the Court's current treatment of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause claims in the context of accommodation. Nor does it
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S. Richardson School of Law of the University of Hawai'i. I thank the dean, faculty, and
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depend on any historical understanding of the scope of permissible
accommodations, nor on any historical understanding of the substantive
meaning of the Religion Clauses.2 Although compelling historical arguments
support the legitimacy of broad accommodations of religion,3 there is no
consensus, nor any real prospect for one, on that question or even on whether
that question matters.' Hence this paper steps back and considers, in light of
that lack of consensus, whether there are compelling reasons why judges ought
to be drawing the necessary lines. My suggestion is that the Court should
largely defer to the political branches in their determination of how religion
should be accommodated. Within the relatively broad boundaries described
2 There is, of course, an enormous literature on these questions, and it will do here only
to cite a few examples of historical treatments, coming from diverse perspectives. See, e.g.,
WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976);
GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURcH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
(1994); MICHAEL W. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN: RELIGION AND
POLITIcs IN AMERICA (1987); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OFOUR COUNTRY (1998). One
could fill pages, if not volumes, with additional citations.
' See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation]; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Dean Choper
notes that "proscribing exemptions would be inconsistent with much evidence in respect to
original intent." JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 114 (1997).
4 See MARK DEWOLmE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 45-48 (1995) (arguing that the history of the Religion Clauses doesn't speak to the
question of permissible lines of accommodation); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 32-36 (1986) (arguing that history of the
Religion Clauses is too complex and ambiguous to constrain current interpretations of the scope
of permissible accommodation); William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925,930-31 (1986) (arguing that there is ambiguity in history
over the degree to which the Establishment Clause permits accommodations of religion); Mark
V. Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 LOY. L. REV. 221, 229
(1987) (arguing same as TUSHNET, supra). See also Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PITr. L. REV. 75, 129 (1990) (arguing that originalist arguments are
insufficiently precise to dictate one approach to the Establishment Clause, and stating that
"although history helps to define the choices between these alternative traditions, it cannot make
this choice for us"); Frank Guliuzza Im1, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based
Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 372
(1993) (arguing that the historical evidence is conflicting). For an interesting argument that the
historical issues surrounding the Establishment Clause's applicability to the States should be
analyzed based on the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
First Amendment, see Kurt D. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The
Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995).
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below, the Court should be willing to allow the political branches to make the
choice of the appropriate lines, subject to the proviso that what is going on is
a true accommodation and not an establishment of religion in any significant
sense.
I. THE COURT AND ACCOMMODATION
As Michael McConnell, the leading accommodationist scholar, put it, when
the government accommodates religion, it "take[s] religion specifically into
account, not for the purpose of promoting the government's own favored form
of religion, but of allowing individuals and groups to exercise their own
religion - whatever it may be - without hindrance."' Giving content to the line
between permissible accommodation and impermissible establishment has
troubled the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence. The
"foundation" of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is often said
to be the principle that "the State may not favor or endorse either religion
generally over nonreligion or one religion over others."6 How does that
principle square with religion-conscious government conduct of any sort? Any
accommodation of religion beyond the demands of the Constitution itself, as
reflected in the Free Exercise Clause, would seem to constitute government
conduct favoring religion over non-religion. But always refusing to take any
account of religion would be to prefer non-religion to religion - a position
forbidden by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment,7 as well as by the
Religion Clauses.! Thus the doctrine finds itself in a familiar dilemma: To
remain true to a clear principle that religion cannot ever be favored over non-
religion, the Court would have to come into direct conflict with the demands
of the Free Exercise Clause, which mandates that government sometimes take
account of religion to protect religious freedom. Short of that extreme,
however, some have taken the position that the Establishment Clause forbids
5 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685,688 (1992).
6 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,589-99,598-602 (1989); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987); School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,389-92 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985);
PIHiLPB. KuRLAND, RELIGION ANDTHELAW 18 (1962); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive,
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
' See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
8 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (providing as part of its famous test that
government may not inhibit religion).
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the government to ever take account of religion - and certainly not in any way
that favors religion - except insofar as the Free Exercise Clause requires.9
Even that position, however, would require the rejection of any number of
long-accepted practices, including any accommodations of religion short of
those required by free exercise. For example, it is difficult to see how to
square the exemption for religious employers in Title VII with that view.'°
Indeed, it would seem that religious exemptions from any generally applicable
laws, as well as any number of other traditional practices such as the reference
to God on our currency, would be in jeopardy if the Court were to take
seriously the position that religion can never be preferred to non-religion short
of the requirements of free exercise. On the other hand, it is plain that the
Establishment Clause must be understood to erect some meaningful barrier to
government involvement with religion." Although the Court has not been
clear about the matter, its cases have agreed with Michael McConnell's
observation that there must exist a category of permissible government
facilitation of religion that lies "between the accommodations compelled by
the Free Exercise Clause and the benefits to religion prohibited by the
Establishment Clause."'1
2
For purposes of this article, I am interested in just that category of cases -
those in which the Free Exercise Clause does not require the government to
accommodate religious sensibilities, 3 yet the government engages in conduct
9 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring).
10 Cf Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the Title
VII exemption).
I As for the cases, this point should go without citation. At the very least, the government
is obliged to take account of religion insofar as it is necessary to do so to comply with the Free
Exercise Clause. Perhaps the leading work suggesting such an absolute principle was done by
Philip Kurland. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961). See also Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 373. As for the history, for just a sampling of
the competing historical treatments, see ROBERTL. CORD, SEPARATION OFCHURCH AND STATE
(1982); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EsTABuSHMENT CLAUSE (1994).
12 McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3, at 3.
3 Since the decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), of course, this category of cases is much broader than many had previously thought.
For just a smattering of the "mostly critical," see CHOPER, SECURING, supra note 3, at 54-57;
Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Comment: The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118, 140-41 (1993); James D. Gordon, HI, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743, 754 (1992) (providing academic commentary on Smith); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against the Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 555,570-75 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CI. L. REv. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism]; Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
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that nonetheless seeks to ease the burden on believers. Examples of
accommodation include allowing religiously-motivated use of peyote
notwithstanding general laws barring the practice. 4 An important historical
example was the exemption from prohibition for the sacramental use of wine. 5
Because "[t]here have already been countless writings making the basic case
(doctrinal and historical) for protecting religious exercise through
accommodations from generally applicable laws,"' 6 I will not here offer yet
another general theoretical or doctrinal treatment of the problem of
accommodation. Instead, as a way of exploring the underlying power
assumptions in the Court's cases, I will simply analyze the Court's leading
cases with a view toward understanding the Court's treatment of non-
mandatory exemptions for religious actors.
In the decades immediately preceding the Court's landmark decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, ' the Court
confronted a series of cases raising two related questions involving
accommodation. First, the Court was confronted with the question whether the
Free Exercise Clause mandates exemptions from generally applicable norms
for those whose religious beliefs impeded their willingness (or ability, from the
perspective of the believer) to conform with the law. Second (and this line of
cases post-dates Smith as well), the Court decided a series of cases dealing
with the question whether the Establishment Clause barred government actions
exempting religion from generally applicable norms. It threatens an
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231-37 (1991). For defenses of the historical basis of the
free exercise doctrine of Smith, see Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemption and
the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 915 (1992). See also MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLITIcS (1978); Ellis West,
The Case Against a Right to Religious-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PUB.
POL'Y 624 (1990). For Professor McConnell's response to his academic and judicial critics, see
Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience ?:
A Critique of Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 819 (1998).
" Although the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Free Exercise Clause requires
such an exemption, see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), it specifically referred to the common practice of providing accommodations. See id.
at 890. By way of example, although federal law bars the use of peyote as a general matter,
see 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 844 (1994), religious uses of peyote by members of the Native
American Church is accommodated by regulation, see 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2000), and
arguably by statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994) (codifying the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488).
'" See National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. 2,3,41 Stat. 305,308 (1919) (repealed
1935).
16 Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U.
ARK. Lrrl.E ROCK L.J. 715, 717 (1998).
17 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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unconstitutional violation of free exercise not to exempt property owned by
religious orders from general taxes,"8 or perhaps to apply the labor laws to
religious employers, 9 but it is an unconstitutional establishment of religion to
exempt religious publications from tax obligations unless other non-profit
publications enjoy a similar tax break.2" It is an unconstitutional violation of
free exercise not to exempt Amish children from education requirements,2' or
Sabbatarians from a requirement that they be available for work as a condition
for receiving public assistance; 22 yet it is an unconstitutional establishment of
religion to require employers to provide a day of rest for religious observers
23
or to allow a religiously or culturally distinctive community to organize public
affairs in a way that takes account of the group's distinctive identity.24 In this
part, I will examine and compare these two lines of cases. Let me start with
my conclusion: The primary feature that distinguishes many of these cases is
the Court's confidence in the judiciary's ability to make accommodations and
a commensurate lack of confidence in the political process's ability to make
accommodations in similar or even identical circumstances.
A. Free Exercise Exemptions
The Court's pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence reflected a pattern of
frequently engaging in scrutiny of government conduct to determine whether
it violated the Free Exercise Clause, yet infrequently concluding that
exemptions were required.25 Only in two areas, compulsory education and
unemployment benefits, was there any robust doctrine requiring exemptions.26
18 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
'9 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
20 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding that it violates the
Speech Clause to tax publications differently based upon their content).
2 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
22 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
23 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
24 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705
(1994).
25 See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4
CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 147 (1987) (noting that the Court rarely struck down government
conduct as violating the Free Exercise Clause under strict scrutiny).
26 In earlier years, the Court had held that the Free Exercise Clause required Jehovah's
Witnesses who made their living by selling religious tracts door-to-door to be exempted from
license taxes. See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (requiring city to
exempt religious booksellers from tax on door-to-door salesm~en); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (same).
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1. Compulsory education
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,27 the Court held that it violated the Free Exercise
Clause to require Amish children to attend school up to age sixteen. A group
of Amish parents objected to sending their children to public school past the
age of fourteen, even though Wisconsin's compulsory education law required
their school attendance. The parents pointed to their "fundamental belief that
salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the
world and worldly influence... devot[ed] to a life in harmony with nature and
the soil, as exemplified by the simple life."2 The Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger, agreed that the "Amish objection to formal education
beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious
concepts., 29 High school education "is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only
because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs
... but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life."3
While the Court agreed that "[piroviding public schools ranks at the very apex
of the function of a State," in the context of the Amish faith and community,
the State's interest in seeing to the education of its citizens was insufficiently
weighty to insist that the Amish conform. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause
demanded that the State's compulsory attendance law give way to the interests
of parents in directing the education of their children.
On the one hand, the decision in Yoder is part of a long tradition protecting
parental rights, particularly when it comes to the education of their children.32
On the other hand, the case is an unusual example of the Free Exercise Clause
being held to require an exemption from a generally applicable law. For
present purposes the interesting aspect of the case is the Court's disagreement
with the State's decision - reached through the legitimate processes of
government - that it was more important to insist that young people be
educated up to age sixteen than it was to accede to the demands for special
treatment by religious believers.
27 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
28 Id. at 210.
29 Id.
3o Id. at211.
3 .Id. at 213.
32 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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2. Unemployment compensation
In Sherbert v. Verner,33 the Court was faced with a conflict between state
law that required those seeking unemployment benefits to be available for
work, including on Saturdays, and the objections of a Seventh-Day Adventist
whose religious beliefs barred her from working on Saturdays. The Court held
that the South Carolina's requirement, while generally valid, must be strictly
scrutinized to determine whether the State could insist on compliance in the
face of religious objections.34 Finding no compelling state interest to justify the
State's insistence on enforcing its policy without exceptions, the Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause required the State to provide the benefits.35
Unlike Yoder, the decision in Sherbert proved to have some progeny.36 In
a series of cases in the following years, the Court held that States must
consider religious objections to the requirements of participating in state
benefits regimes. For example, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division,37 a Jehovah's Witness refused to accept a job
transfer to a job that involved production of armaments on the ground that his
pacifist religious convictions were inconsistent with participating in the
production of war-making materials.3 He challenged as a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause the State's refusal to provide him with unemployment
compensation benefits.39 Indiana justified its refusal on the ground that the
worker had voluntarily made himself unavailable for work.' Applying
Sherbert's analysis, the Court subjected the State's decision to strict scrutiny
and concluded that the State's policy must give way in the face of the
claimant's religious objection.41
33 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3 Justice Brennan's opinion consistently referred to the "conscientious objection" of the
individual rather than the "religious objection." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399, 403. The case,
however, was plainly about the religious beliefs of the claimant, and the Court's reference to
conscience is not important for purposes of this article.
31 See id.
36 The Court refused to exempt the Amish from the Social Security System in United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982). The Court feared that allowing religious objectors to opt
out of the Social Security System would lead to a wide variety of claims for religious
exemptions from general tax schemes, or to the making of exceptions based on unprincipled
lines. The practical difficulty of accommodating the Amish in the tax situation distinguished
the case from Yoder. See id.
17 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
38 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709-10.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 709.
41 See id. at 718-19.
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In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security42 and Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,43 the Court followed suit.
Both cases involved objections by believers to working on their Sabbath. In
Hobbie, the claimant was another Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work
on Saturday because of his religious beliefs." The employer and employee
had unsuccessfully tried to accommodate the religious objections by arranging
for flexible work hours; but the employee ultimately determined that he could
not work the necessary hours.45 The State concluded that the employee's
refusal to work flexible hours was misconduct within the meaning of state law
and that he was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits. 6 In Frazee,
the claimant was a Christian who similarly objected to working on Sunday, his
Sabbath.47 The State objected that the claimant was not a member of any
organized faith and thus that his faith did not forbid his working on Sunday."
The Court concluded that the claimant's beliefs were sincerely held, and
refused to second-guess his objection to working on Sunday.49 In both Frazee
and Hobbie the Supreme Court concluded in straightforward applications of
Sherbert and Thomas that the refusal to provide unemployment compensation
violated the Free Exercise Clause.
As with Yoder, the unemployment compensation cases are significant
because they reject the decision of the political process not to accommodate
religious objections to complying with state law. The Court took as an
unquestioned premise its role as final arbiter of the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause. That has been true in each instance - rare as they have been - of the
Court holding that a State has violated the Free Exercise Clause by insisting
on enforcing generally applicable laws.5
42 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
43 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
4 See id. at 138.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 138-39.
' See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 829.
4 See id.
49 See id. at 834.
o Only once has the Court held that a state actor has imposed and enforced a general law
with the explicit purpose of burdening religious exercise. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). The Court found in Lukumi that animal
sacrifice ordinances enacted by the City of Hialeah, Florida, "had as their object the suppression
of [the Santeria] religion." Id. at 540. In every other instance where the Court has found a free
exercise violation, it has found that the incidental burden of a law - and not its true object - was
to burden religious exercise, and that notwithstanding the lack of ill motive the State had to
yield to religious exercise.
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B. Exemptions as Establishment?
1. Mandatory exemptions
For purposes of this article, it is more pressing to think about whether
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause than it is to worry about the free
exercise problem. The Court has been careful to conclude that exemptions
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause do not constitute unconstitutional
establishments.5 The Court explained in Sherbert that "the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers
reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face
of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious
with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall."52 The Court's view has been that there is no Establishment Clause
problem with providing a mandatory exemption due to the government's
obligation to treat religion in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner; the
Court has been clear again and again that the Establishment Clause is no bar
to neutral state programs where the failure to include religious actors in a
scheme would be effectively to treat them worse on account of religion.53 The
insistence on neutral, not disfavorable, treatment of religion is the general
explanation for why free exercise exemptions are not establishments.'
2. Permissive exemptions as establishment
In another category of cases, however, the Court has been hesitant to permit
the government to accommodate religion where the Free Exercise Clause does
not insist that it do so. The Court's record has not been uniform; there are
examples in which the Court has either implied that it would accept, or has
outright accepted, government accommodation. It is difficult to find
principled lines between the cases, but one does not often see the Court
referring to the legitimacy of the democratic process as a ground for permitting
accommodation.
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20
(1981). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205, 220-21 (1972).
52 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
53 SeeCapitol Square Rev. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rectors and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
54 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTREDAME J. OF
L. & PUB. POL'Y 341 (1999). See also Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United
States: Fin de Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. LJ. 295,302 (2000); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The
Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 323, 343-45.
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In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor," the Court struck down under the
Establishment Clause a Connecticut state law that required employers to
provide days off for employees whose religious scruples barred working on the
Sabbath. The Court did not treat the case as particularly difficult; Chief Justice
Burger wrote an opinion for eight Justices56 that was brief and to the point: The
government may not by statute insist that employers and other employees
engage in conduct to facilitate the religious exercise of others.57 By passing
a statute granting a right to all to take off the Sabbath, the State preferred those
engaging in conduct for religious reasons to others who, though they might
want a guaranteed day off, had no religious ground for claiming one.58 As
Chief Justice Burger put it:
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and employees an
absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious
practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee
unilaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer and others must adjust
their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an
employee.59
Finding no secular interest to support the statute, the Court struck it down as
having the primary effect of promoting religion.' ° The Court's substantive
analysis was about four paragraphs long.
The Court in Thornton did not address the Sherbert line of cases and the
principle that one's eligibility for unemployment benefits cannot be affected
by religious scruples.6 There are formal distinctions between the situations,
to be sure; for example, requiring benefits to be paid in the Sherbert situation
imposed obligations on the government and no direct obligations on any
private actors. And the Court's opinion did mention the fact that the statutory
exemption imposed obligations on private actors to accommodate the religious
faiths of others.62
55 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
56 Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Marshall. See
id. at 711. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter and he did not bother to write an opinion.
See id.
57 See id. at 708-09.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 709.
6 Id.
6 For a full and illuminating discussion of the issues raised by Thornton, see McConnell,
Accommodation, supra note 3, at 50-58.
62 See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58,
61 (2d Cir. 1953)). The Court had earlier held that it would constitute an undue hardship to an
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The Court did not deal, however, with the oddness of the result - the State
is required by the Free Exercise Clause to accommodate religious belief by
providing access to benefits to those whose religions make them unavailable
for work at certain times, but barred by the Establishment Clause from
arranging affairs so that the believer can continue to work without violating his
or her religious tenets. As others have noted, the failure of the statute at issue
in Thornton to provide for an exception mechanism could potentially have
raised problems of fairness to the private actors who were required to provide
the accommodation.63 Our law frequently requires private individuals to incur
costs, however, and sometimes substantial ones, to serve public ends. The
necessity of providing unemployment compensation to employees who are
unavailable for work due to religious commitments surely imposes costs on
private actors, at least in the form of the general public; moreover, it is a
common feature of unemployment compensation schemes that a particular
employer's contributions are related to the costs imposed as the result of his
or her employees. 64 In the end, the costs of the accommodation mandated by
the Sherbert line of cases are not significantly different from the costs of the
statutory accommodation that was struck down as an establishment of religion
in Thornton.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court's obliviousness to the point in both
contexts, it was the government making the decision whether and how religion
would be accommodated in both instances. In Sherbert and its progeny, the
government, in the form of judges, insisted - in a legally binding way - that
the religious tenets of individuals must be accommodated and respected. In
the Thornton situation, again it was the government, this time in the form of
the Connecticut legislature, which insisted that the religious tenets of
employees needing the Sabbath off must be accommodated. The legally
employer under Title Vil's accommodation scheme to require it to alter a negotiated collective
bargaining seniority system to accommodate the religious need of some employees to have the
Sabbath off of work. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The
dissenters in Hardison noted that the Court's resolution of the statutory Title VII question
avoided the question whether it would violate the Establishment Clause to impose substantial
costs on an employer for a religious accommodation. See id. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63 See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3, at 57.
6 For example, the Federal Unemployment Tax is a percentage of the total wages paid by
an employer with respect to employment. See 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994). Further, many state
unemployment compensation schemes vary the rates of contributions from employers based
upon the benefits paid to former employees. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 977 (West
1986 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.131 (West 2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A,
§ 14 (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.19 (West 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 268.05 (West 2000); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 204.041-204.043 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000). The effect of such programs is that "if relatively few former employees have
become eligible for benefits, the employer's rate of contribution is adjusted downward." Easy
Street West v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 345 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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binding nature of the governmental decision in both instances cannot be
doubted.
The Court's indifference to the legitimacy of political resolutions to
problems of accommodation is made even more clear when we recognize that
in neither situation did the Court permit the political process to have its way.
In the unemployment compensation cases, the political process had determined
that benefits should not be paid, even after considering the religious objections
of the individuals involved. Apparently taking heed of the Court's message
that Sabbath work could not constitutionally be required, the political process
in Connecticut moved to meet the constitutional challenge, by providing an
accommodation before the issue of unemployment could even arise. There,
too, the Court was unwilling to let the political process have its say. The
message of the Sherbert line and Thornton in combination, in the end, can be
reduced to the proposition that the Court will draw the lines of permissible and
mandatory accommodation, and political actors need only follow along.65
Consider another example of exemption as establishment. In Texas Monthly
v. Bullock,66 the Court held that a Texas state law providing a tax exemption
for religious periodicals violated the Establishment Clause. By singling out
religious tracts for favorable treatment, the State was advancing religion for
religion's sake, and in the absence of a secular purpose for exempting religious
publications and not others, the regime was unconstitutional. The Court
concluded that "[i]t is difficult to view Texas' narrow exemption as anything
but state sponsorship of religious belief."'67 In addition to relying heavily on
the focused nature of the exemption, the Court also found it important that the
exemption was unnecessary to accommodate anyone's religious tenets. Unlike
the situation in past accommodation cases, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
said, the Texas sales tax exemption relieves no burden on any believer's
exercise of his or her religion.'
Faced with its past cases allowing tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions, and indeed interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to mandate them in
some circumstances, the Court was left both to distinguish and disavow prece-
63 The Court's later decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), reversed this lack of confidence in the political process as a general
matter in determining whether exemptions are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. (As for
the Sherbert line, however, the Court distinguished those cases and refused to overrule them.
See id. at 876-80). Indeed, the decision in Smith had much to say about the central importance
of the political process, and the accountability that comes with it, in striking the line between
conformance and exemptions. See id. at 890.
66 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 15; see also id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A statutory
preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what
the Establishment Clause is all about and hence is constitutionally intolerable.").
68 Id. at 19-20.
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dent. As for distinguishing prior law, the Court viewed its cases approving tax
exemptions for religious organizations as not being about providing exemp-
tions for religious activity, but as about providing exemptions for larger classes
of activity that included within them religious actors. For example, in Walz v.
Tax Commission of New York City,' the Court "sustained a property tax
exemption that applied to religious properties no less than to real estate owned
by a wide array of nonprofit organizations,"7 not out of any desire to make life
easier for religious actors; on the contrary, the property tax exemption was sus-
tained - in the Court's own words - "despite the sizable tax savings it accord-
ed religious groups."'" Thus, for the Texas Monthly Court, exemptions from
general tax obligations for religious groups depend upon there being a broad
range of activities exempted; in fact, the religious character of any exemptee
is a detriment to be tolerated rather than a benefit to be fostered. The Court
distinguished its other cases upholding tax exemptions in the same way.72
The Court in Texas Monthly handled other cases providing for religion-
specific exemptions a little differently. As for those exemptions, the Court
emphasized that the burden on non-believers from the exemptions were
minimal, and that the absence of the exemption would have imposed a
significant burden (even if not an unconstitutional one) on the religious actor.
For example, the release time program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson73 imposed
no costs oi the students who were left behind in the public school. And the
statutory exemption from employment discrimination laws upheld in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos 74 was permissible even "though
it had some adverse effect on those holding or seeking employment with those
organizations (if not on taxpayers generally)," because it "prevented
potentially serious encroachments on protected religious freedoms. 75
The Court's explanation of the differences between Texas Monthly and the
permissive accommodation cases was unpersuasive.76 In the first place, the
69 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
70 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20.
", Id. (emphasis added).
72 See id. ("In all of these cases, however, we emphasized that the benefits derived by
religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well. Indeed, were
those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have appeared other than as
state sponsorship of religion; if that were so, we would not have hesitated to strike them down
for lacking a secular purpose and effect.").
73 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
74 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
71 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18.
76 Justice Scalia filed a spirited dissent arguing that the Court's treatment of precedent in
Texas Monthly was unpersuasive and inconsistent with the prior cases and with longstanding
American tradition. See id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For present purposes, I am more
interested in the Court's treatment of the theoretical question when exemptions are permissible
(though not required) than in whether its treatment of prior cases was fair.
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Court did not deal with the problem that the balancing of burdens involves
incommensurates; the harm to, or burden on, non-believers from an
accommodation is of a different sort from the burden imposed on religion from
the failure to accommodate. It is hard to see how administration of the
general principle that religion may not be favored over non-religion depends
on whether government action imposes real world burdens on private actors.
Moreover, taking the question of burden on its own terms, as a matter of
economics the general public absolutely subsidizes religion when religious
organizations receive tax exemptions whether or not other organizations do."
The burden is diffuse and insignificant, but it exists. In the case of an
exemption from employment discrimination laws such as the one in Title VII
upheld in Amos, the person who does not get ajob, or loses her job, due to her
religion surely is burdened by the political judgment that religious
organizations ought to be able to take account of religion in their employment
decisions. Unless the Title VII exemption is required by the Free Exercise
Clause, then, it is hard to see it as anything but favorable treatment for religion
even if, as the Texas Monthly plurality noted, the absence of an exemption
would threaten religious freedom values."8
As for disavowing its prior cases, the Court in Texas Monthly offered a
narrow reading of its decisions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania79 and Follett v.
McCormick,80 two cases that struck down under the Free Exercise Clause
occupational taxes as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses who sold religious books
door to door. The Court characterized the licensing schemes at issue as
occupational taxes on practicing religion that therefore directly burdened its
free exercise; there was no doubt, the Court said, that the government could
include religion within general income or property taxes, but a specific tax on
the occupation of being a minister was unacceptable.8 ' But the Court in the
prior cases had gone further, saying that it was unconstitutional to tax religious
7 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,404 (1983).
7' The Court itself recognized this point when it pointed out in Texas Monthly that taxpayers
were being asked to subsidize religion in the amount of decreased tax revenues from the
exemption. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (noting that the tax exemption "burdens
nonbeneficiaries by increasing their tax bills by whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit
bestowed on subscribers to religious publications").
79 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
o 321 U.S. 573 (944).
"j See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 22-24.
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publications at all.82 That position, the Court said in Texas Monthly, was
inconsistent with subsequent cases83 and should be disavowed.84
Notwithstanding the Court's distinction of the broad reading of Murdock
and Follett, there remains some tension in the principles underlying the Texas
Monthly rejection of a tax exemption and the prior cases holding that tax
exemptions are sometimes required by the Free Exercise Clause.85 On the one
hand, there is no doubt that the payment of taxes burdens religious exercise,
and directly so. On the other hand, religious believers have long been required
to conform their conduct to general law even where some burden on religion
is the result. That is the basis for the Court's holding in Smith that the Free
Exercise Clause does not generally mandate exemptions unless there is reason
to believe that the law targets religion for religion's sake. But in the context
of permissive accommodations, the Court has purported to adhere to the
position that religion may not be fostered for its own sake, and certainly not
at the expense of non-religion. That principle is violated when the government
exempts religion even though the Free Exercise Clause does not require it to
do so.
Texas Monthly reflects the Court's willingness to closely superintend the
political process's resolution of accommodation questions. For the Court, it
was unacceptable for Texas to decide as a matter of legislative policy not to
tax religious publications unless the State could show that the exemption was
provided despite religion rather than because of it. As Justice Scalia pointed
out, the Texas scheme was not unusual.8 6 The federal government and at least
fifteen States had some close variant of the Texas scheme on their books.
Perhaps some, but certainly not all, of those tax exemptions stemmed from a
desire not to treat religion any worse than other charitable endeavors. But it
seems reasonable to speculate that public actors sometimes exempt religion
from legal burdens out of respect for religion and a desire to foster it. As
Michael McConnell has argued, there is a long tradition of the government
acting that way, and so long as there is no discrimination among
82 See, e.g., Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109, 111-12.
83 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting claim that the
government could not deny a tax exemption to entities that discriminate on account of race
where the discrimination is claimed to be religiously based).
8 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 21.
85 There is an additional difference between Texas Monthly and the other tax exemption
cases. The nature of the burden imposed by the tax in Follett and Murdock was far more severe
- devastating the believers' ability to make a living - than was the burden in Texas Monthly.
In the latter case, the burden of the sales tax was real, but less practically devastating. The
Court did not rely upon this distinction, however, and it is not one that makes a difference to
my analysis.
86 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 30-33 & nn.2, 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
widespread tax exemptions that specifically mention religion and citing state laws that did so).
2000 / PRIMACY OF POLITICAL ACTORS
denominations, that is the sort of permissive accommodation that should be
permitted.87
Whether or not the Court was correct in Texas Monthly as a matter of
manipulating doctrine or as a matter of the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause, the point here is that the Court did not consider
deferring to the political process's resolution of the question. On the contrary,
the political nature of the solution only made the Court more resolute in
stepping in to protect what it viewed as constitutional principle.
That suspicious judicial attitude is carried over even in instances where the
Court permitted a permissive accommodation of religion. Just a couple of
examples will suffice. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,88 the
Court upheld the exemption for religious employers from Title Vl's ban on
job discrimination based on religion.89 The Court gave a variety of reasons for
why the exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause. First, applying
the three-part Lemon test,9° the Court held that the exemption was supported
by the secular purposes of the government's avoiding the position of
"abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular
point of view in religious matters," and of "alleviat[ing] significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define
and carry out their religious missions."9' Second, the Court held that the
primary effect of the exemption was not to advance religion - though it was
doubtless easier for religious employers to order their affairs without the threat
of employment discrimination liability - because the exemption did not consist
of the government's taking action to foster religion. The exemption was
merely removing the government from the picture. 92 Third, far from entangl-
ing government with religion, the exemption was designed to minimize the
occasions for government scrutiny of the activities of religious employers. 93
On the question whether the statute as a general matter impermissibly
favored religion as religion, the Court found "unpersuasive" the argument that
the statute was questionable as "singl[ing] out religious entities for a benefit." 94
On the contrary, though the Court had to acknowledge that it had "given
weight to this consideration in its past decisions," 5 the Court claimed that:
87 See generally McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3; McConnell, supra note 5.
"' 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
89 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, § 702, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1994).
90 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9' Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
92 See id. at 336.
9' See id.
94 Id. at 338.
9' Id. Here the Court cited a prior footnote in its opinion which in turn cited two cases
which had relied upon the breadth of a program - that is, whether it included non-religious as
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it has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious
groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases
that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment
Clause... Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a
regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that
the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.96
It is worth noting that there was no claim in Amos that the statutory exemption
was required by the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, the case was purely about
a permissive exemption. That puts into stark relief the remarkable passage
quoted above, which denies that the Court has treated favoring religion as
religion as impermissible on that basis alone. Any exemption for religious
actors or activity grants religion a benefit that others do not receive; that is, in
fact, the point.
Turning to the question of political versus judicial power, again in Amos the
Court gave no hint that the constitutional judgments of Congress - which had
enacted the Title VII exemption, and later revisited the issue and broadened
the exemption - might be entitled to judicial respect, much less deference. It
is difficult to fault the Court for this, of course, because the legal culture and
its precedents so uniformly treat the matter as entirely one for judicial
resolution. And although the Court in the end concluded in Amos, and in other
cases of legislative accommodation,' that the political judgment could stand,
it did so after evaluating the matter independently and without reference to the
role of the political actors on the stage.
Stepping back, one can see a pattern emerge. The Court is suspicious
(though not uniformly so, as Amos exemplifies) of legislative accommodation
of religion that is not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. And it has been
willing to interpose the judicial power both to require accommodations
(though, again, the doctrine is not uniform and the Smith regime makes the
well as religious actors within its beneficiaries - in determining whether it impermissibly'
advanced religion. See id. at 334 n. 11 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983), and
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)).
96 Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).
97 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
In the course of rejecting other claims that the Free Exercise Clause mandated an
accommodation, the Court has sometimes suggested that a permissive accommodation would
pass muster. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986).
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occasions for intervention much more rare9 ') and to condemn them as violative
of the Establishment Clause.
As one compares the decision in Thornton with the Sherbert line, for
example, it is difficult to see meaningful distinctions beyond faith in judicial
power and lack of confidence in political power. Thornton tells us that the
legislature cannot require that individuals be allowed to take off work on their
Sabbath, but Sherbert tells us that individuals cannot be harmed in seeking
unemployment benefits by the unwillingness to work on their Sabbath. The
tension is made even more acute when one considers that the Court elsewhere
has undercut its stated grounds for the decision in Thornton. Thornton said
that the statutory exemption was too focused to protect religious observers, and
nobody else; it also told us that the government may not require one private
actor to bear the burden of another's exercise of religion. But Amos said just
the opposite - if a statutory exemption removes burdens on religious exercise,
it is permissible for legislature in effect to foster religious exercise. (One
wonders how it could be otherwise.) Moreover, Amos acknowledges that the
statutory exemption from employment discrimination laws for religious
employers will inevitably harm some private individuals who are treated
differently on account of their religion; but the Court says that such burdens
are the inevitable product of the accommodation. Simply stated, it is hard to
explain Thornton.
Much the same is true of Texas Monthly. There the Court relied heavily on
the religion-specific nature of the tax exemption, and the lack of any
explanation for it other than the advancement of religion. Under Amos,
however, there is a ready secular justification for the tax exemption - it
reduces the occasions on which the government will have to deal with the
religious publication through audits, tax assessments, and the like. If, as Amos
held, it is permissible to exempt religion as religion from employment
discrimination laws, then how can it be impermissible to exempt a religious
magazine from a sales tax? The same point holds for Texas Monthly's reliance
as a ground for finding an Establishment Clause violation on the fact that non-
believing taxpayers would have to make up the slack for the lost revenues
from the tax exemption. Amos says that non-believers sometimes must pay the
price even for a permissive accommodation. Moreover, it is inevitably true
that the taxpayers generally will pay the price of any accommodation,
including requiring unemployment benefits to be paid to those who cannot
work for religious reasons.
98 Although Smith is perceived as having substantially modified the law of free exercise,
and although it surely, as a practical matter, made free exercise claims less likely to succeed,
it is notable that Smith did not overrule any cases and instead specifically left on the books the
mandatory accommodation cases reflected by Yoder and the Sherbert line. See Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-86 (1990).
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For all the intricacies of the doctrine, and the copious commentary, let us
reconsider the institutional arrangements by which the legal regime is
administered. In the next part of this paper, I will turn to an analysis of the
problem of accommodation that is grounded on the notion that courts are not
necessarily better situated to decide these matters and thus ought not to
interfere with the views of those who answer to the people.
]I. ACCOMMODATION AND POLmCAL ACTORS
Thus far, this article has sought to illustrate the Court's default bias toward
judges and against political actors in determining the appropriate scope of
accommodation of religion under both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. In this part, I will turn to an analysis of that allocation
of institutional roles in cases dealing with the constitutional law of religion.
The Court's treatment of questions under the Religion Clauses generally,
and questions of accommodation of religion in particular, reflect its general
approach to judicial review. When a case raising a constitutional question
comes before it, the Court's tradition - with exceptions - has been simply to
resolve the question in the course of deciding the case. The Court's
confidence in judicial power and suspicion of political power rationalizes
many seeming inconsistencies in the cases, particularly those between
Thornton and the Sherbert line. But rather than rehearsing that argument here,
I want now to suggest that the occasion for robust judicial review is less
pressing in the context of accommodation of religion.
My argument depends on two factors, which I will consider in turn. First,
it is inevitable that governmental actors will draw the final lines between
permissible and impermissible accommodation; the options are either judges
or politically accountable officials. Because it will be the government
deciding the question in any event, there needs to be some reason why judges
ought to have the final say and not the people through the democratic process.
Second, in the context of true accommodations of religion, the reasons why
judges are given the power of judicial review are less pressing and the reasons
why the political process's resolution of the question should stand are strong.
Thus, unless the accommodation is a mask for some denominational privilege,
the Court ought to defer to the judgment that an accommodation of religion is
appropriate once that decision has been made by the responsible political
actors.
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A. The Inevitability of Government Resolution of the Question
1. Courts as state actors
The standard account of judicial review sets judges above the political fray,
treating them as non-political actors charged with vindicating constitutional
principle against the attacks of the presumably less-nobly motivated political
process." As a corollary, it is often thought as part of our constitutional theory
that the Court is generally better situated to resolve constitutional questions
than political actors.'/° The fact that federal judges (and Supreme Court
Justices in particular) enjoy life tenure and salary protection ensures
independence from electoral pressure, and thus that constitutional issues are
resolved fairly and impartially - in short, that our public law is untainted by
political bias.
Scholars have long recognized, however, that courts are (at least interstitial)
lawmakers despite their lack of political accountability, and that they cannot
be entirely separated from political forces. For example, the great Alexander
Bickel's work in the post-Brown era of judicial activism was largely an
attempt to reconcile the demands of legal principle and the inevitability of
politics.'' More recently, scholars have increasingly come to argue that hearty
judicial review is a mistake, and that the Court's role ought to be less robust,
with the people, through their political institutions or even direct democracy,
more often having the final say on constitutional issues." 2 Other work, while
not going so far, has nonetheless emphasized a judicial role that is more
modest and constrained than has been the convention during the last half-
century. 103 These developments in constitutional theory have been partly about
the need to reconcile the Court's role of sometimes rejecting the product of
99 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (arguing that the
Court should refrain from deciding cases raising questions of government structure and separa-
tion of powers in order to reserve its capital for protecting individual rights from majoritarian
ill treatment); JOHN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (articulating the Court's role
in wielding judicial review as limited to correcting defects in the political process).
"o See, e.g., Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1; Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d. ed. 1986, 1st ed. 1962); PHILIP BOBBIT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); ELY, supra note 99.
101 See BICKEL, supra note 100; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
'2o See RICHARD PARKER, "HERE THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
103 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
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ordinary government processes, which are presumed to have democratic
legitimacy, with its own anti-majoritarian status. They have also been about,
however, the recognition that courts, as well as legislatures, are fundamentally
lawmaking institutions.
Courts wield public power; in constitutional terms, they are state actors, just
as surely as the President and Congress. And as state actors, they, too, are
subject to the Constitution's commands in everything that they do."° To take
an example close to this paper, nothing in the Constitution relieves courts,
including the Supreme Court, from the responsibility to respect First
Amendment freedoms. Thus, it violates the First Amendment unduly to
restrict public access to trials, 05 or to place unduly restrictive gag orders on
journalists"° or parties;'0 7 nor does the First Amendment allow judges to
establish religion or restrict its free exercise.
Thus we do well to remember that in any constitutional case (or any case,
for that matter) the citizen cannot turn to a non-government actor for final
resolution of his or her claim. The government - in the person of a court -
will be making the decision. As Stephen Carter put it, "to file a lawsuit before
a judge is the analytical equivalent of asking state permission to exercise a
"04 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("The action of state courts and ofjudicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment ...."); Brinkerhoff-Haris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673,
680 (1930) ("The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as
well as through its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of government."); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (explaining that state action extends to "the operation of
state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial"); Jones v. Evans, 932 F. Supp.
204, 206 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ("It is clear that the action of state courts and their officers is
regarded as action of the State within the [Flourteenth [A]mendment."). See also Russell W.
Galloway, Jr., The Government-Action Requirement in American Constitutional Law, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 935, 940 (1990).
"05 See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal. for the County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
"o See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Smart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); JB Pictures v.
Department of Defense, 86 F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dictum); Grove Fresh Distribs. v.
Everfresh Juice, 24 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.
1986); United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1986) (dictum); In re The
Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278,
1280 (lth Cir. 1983) (dictum); Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 923 F.Supp 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
"o See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d
I (lst Cir. 1986); Farley v. Farley, 952 F. Supp. 1232 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); Grove Fresh Distribs.
v. John Labatt Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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constitutional right."'"3° Because every question involving the Religion
Clauses thus will be decided by a government actor, the question then becomes
which government actor's answer ought to be given controlling weight. I turn
now to a consideration of that question.
2. Courts as deferential actors
The answer to the question just posed - which government actor will
authoritatively determine the constitutionality of government conduct - has
generally been that courts have the final say on matters involving the
constitutional law of religion. To support that point, one could cite virtually
every religion case that the Court has ever decided. My argument here does
not propose a change in that arrangement, except insofar as the Court
determines that it need not play a primary role in certain contexts of
accommodation of religion. Thus I do not claim that the Court lacks
jurisdiction in these matters, or should not have the final say. In other words,
this is no attack on Marbury v. Madison,"° or Cooper v. Aaron" ° for that
matter. In a contested case or controversy, the Court is bound to decide the
case according to the dictates of the Constitution.
My argument is instead about the interpretive posture the Court should
adopt. Or to put the matter another way, it is about whether the standard of
review that the Court applies should take account of the circumstances and the
relative institutional competence of the judge and the politically accountable
actor whose decision has been challenged in litigation. It is not unthinkable
that the judicial role ought to be secondary to that of the political branches.
Even though that position in the abstract goes against our instincts, the judicial
role is in fact decidedly secondary in any number of constitutional contexts.
The rules of justiciability are only the most prominent among them."' In
addition, rules of abstention and other equitable doctrines have frequently been
invoked by the federal courts to avoid interference with the legitimate role of
coordinate government actors." 2 The Court unquestionably has the power to
1 Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice
Brennan, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1999).
'09 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"0 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
II See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992); Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1997).
12 On abstention, see generally Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25
(1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Commission ofTexas v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). On equitable restraint, see generally Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also FALLON ET AL, supra note 111, at
1230-308; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
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decide cases raising questions of accommodation of religion, but it is worth
remembering that there is nothing revolutionary about the Court's giving great
weight, or deferring to, the constitutional judgment of the political branches
on some questions.
It is also worth remembering that legislatures and executives are under the
same constitutional commands as are courts in making decisions about the
scope of accommodation of religion. Every public officer, at both the state
and federal level, is bound to take an oath (or affirmation) to support the
Constitution.' 3  And despite prominent examples to the contrary in our
history," '4 our tradition in constitutional interpretation has been perhaps
reflexively court-centric." 5 Public actors other than courts have the power,
and indeed the responsibility, to interpret the Constitution in determining how
to carry out their public functions; among those functions sometimes is the
decision whether and how to accommodate the religious sensibilities of some
of the governed. Thus, although "[i]t may seem odd to say that the legislative
branch can engage in constitutional interpretation,"" 6 it is inevitable that it will
do so. This authority is particularly powerful at the federal level because the
substantive lawmaking power in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" 1
7
includes within it the power to make law to enforce the First Amendment.
Thus, when Congress legislates onmatters concerning religion, that is but "one
instance of the general principle that each branch of government has the
authority to interpret the Constitution for itself, within the scope of its own
powers.""' The question, then, is how the Court is to determine in the course
of exercising its own constitutional function of deciding cases or controversies
what weight to give the considered constitutional judgment of coordinate
government actors.
113 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
14 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-24 (13th
ed. 1997) (gathering materials relating to the importance of extra-judicial constitutional
interpretation, especially by Presidents).
"' See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905,906-
07 (1989-90) (recounting the "long tradition of presidential action on the basis of constitutional
views, sometimes at variance with those of the courts"); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore,
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The MostDangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo.
L.J. 217 (1994). See also Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 586 (1975).
116 Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Comment: Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REV. 153,171 (1997). See
also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857 (1999).
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation" the substantive commands of the Fourteenth Amendment).
11' McConnell, supra note 116, at 171.
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Of course, the Marbury presumption is that the Court must exercise
independent judgment in order to decide cases in conformance with the law of
the Constitution." 9 In light of that historic practice, it is important - lest my
argument be taken as an assault on the Marbury power itself - to recall the
ways in which the Court sometimes defers to the decisions reached by the
political branches, even ones raising constitutional questions, while
nonetheless adhering to its responsibility to decide cases or controversies in
conformance with the Constitution.
It is plain that cases involving accommodation of religion are not beyond the
Article mII power of courts to decide. The rules of justiciability require
absolute judicial deference to the political departments, 2° even though real and
important constitutional questions are raised and even if the Court might
disagree on the merits with the political resolution.' My argument involves
a different kind of deference that also finds deep roots in our constitutional
tradition. The Court has never interpreted the Constitution as requiring it
independently to answer every constitutional question that comes before it. On
the contrary, the Court has frequently concluded that its role ought to be
1" See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Hamilton).
20 See FALLON, supra note 111, at 93-293.
121 Consider the example of the Guarantee Clause, the constitutional provision that requires
the federal government to guarantee to the States a republican form of government. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic violence."). Although the Court currently treats the question as unsettled, see
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (reserving the justiciability question and
resolving an essentially frivolous Guarantee Clause claim on the merits), the Court has
sometimes treated claims arising under the Guarantee Clause as non-justiciable political
questions. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1(1849). Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,582 (1964) (noting that "[slome questions
raised under the Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable"). But that does not mean that there is no
answer to the constitutional question in light of the document's text and history whether a
particular form of state government in fact calls into question federal obligations under the
Clause. On the contrary, the Court has acted on the premise both that the question has a right
answer and that it is not the Court's role to give it. The same is true of other political question
categories, perhaps most saliently those that might arise relating to impeachment. See Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
Or consider the doctrine of standing, which insists that there is no Article I power to
resolve a dispute if the party bringing the challenge lacks standing. The Court has stated
unequivocally that it has no power to decide constitutional questions - and thus that the answers
produced by the political process are final - if the party before the Court lacks standing. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). And that is so, the Court says, even if"no
one" would have standing to challenge the decision in question. United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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secondary to that of other government actors even in areas where there is no
true non-justiciability.'22 As James Bradley Thayer noted over a century ago,
the Court's power of judicial review is generally to be employed only in cases
of clear error. 23 That tradition of Thayerian deference still holds as a matter
of substantive constitutional doctrine in a number of areas. The most salient
example is the standard for determining whether legislation touching upon
non-fundamental rights or non-suspect classifications violates due process or
equal protection. It is standard constitutional doctrine that the government
needs only to have a rational basis for such legislation.' 24 As the Court has put
it, "absent some reason to infer antipathy," the Constitution presumes that
"even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."'2 5
That treatment of legislation is perfectly consistent with our constitutional
traditions, which set as our default preferences democratic and accountable
decisionmaking. Justice Holmes once said that "undert[aking] to declare an
Act of Congress unconstitutional.., is the gravest and most delicate duty that
th[e] Court is called on to perform."' 26 The reason why that is so, Professor
Bickel famously said, is the "root difficulty ...that judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force in our system."'127 In circumstances where we
cannot trust the outcome of the political process to be true to the fundamental
law of the Constitution, however, we have a strong tradition of intrusive
judicial review. In such contexts, the unaccountability' 21 of courts leaves
122 See supra note 111.
123 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
124 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993); United States
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (addressing equal protection). See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (addressing due process). See also Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
'2 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
126 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
127 BICKEL, supra note 100, at 16.
128 Here, and throughout the paper, I have taken as a given that the court we should be
worried about is the Supreme Court of the United States, which of course is a federal court
whose judges enjoy life tenure and salary protection. See U.S. CONST. art Ill. The Supreme
Court (and all federal courts) thus are unaccountable at the ballot box and answer to nobody for
their salaries.
This analysis leaves state courts out of the picture. That is a significant omission, though
it is not one that affects my analysis in this paper. State judges decide federal constitutional
questions every day, and are generally obliged to do so when such issues arise in the ordinary
course of their judicial business. Unlike federal judges, state judges can be, and ordinarily are,
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them untainted by political motives in the discharge of their duties, and thus
more worthy of trust in resolving constitutional questions.
B. Popular Outcomes and Accommodation of Religion
This general approach to the role of courts in constitutional law carries over
to the law of the Religion Clauses. In that context, if there is reason not to
trust the outcome of the democratic process, intrusive judicial review is a firm
and warranted part of our tradition. The Court's decision in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 129 however, established
that incidental burdens on the exercise of religion - even highly significant
ones - resulting from generally applicable laws do not implicate the right of
free -exercise of religion at all. Absent some reason to believe that the
government action was directed toward religious exercise, the government
need only have a rational basis for its regulation no matter what its impact on
religious conduct. Although the decision in Smith has been widely
criticized, 3 ' it remains the governing constitutional standard for free exercise
exemptions and it fits comfortably with our general approach to constitutional
adjudication. 3' Neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious
exercise are subject only to rational basis review precisely because there is no
reason to believe in such circumstances that religious exercise has been singled
out for disfavorable treatment. In this part of the paper, I consider whether
accommodation of religion is a context in which we can trust the outcome of
the democratic process, and thus one in which we should expect judicial
deference rather than intrusion. I suggest that it is.
accountable at the ballot box in some form. To the extent that my argument in this paper
suggests that the unaccountability of federal judges is not enough reason to insist on their
having the final word on questions of accommodation, the accountability of statejudges makes
the argument with respect to them afortiori stronger.
129 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
130 For examples of such criticism- as well as defenses of the decision - see supra note 13.
131 It is beside the present point that Smith was rejected by federal statute (albeit
unconstitutionally insofar as the States are concerned). See Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 ("RFRA"), 107 Stat. 1488, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994) (held
unconsitutional as applied to the States in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). That
legislative decision reflected a disagreement with the Court about necessity in policy for
accommodations, and perhaps a difference with the Court on the substantive meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause. That disagreement, however, does not affect my analysis of the relative
institutional competence of courts and legislatures. Indeed, as I shall argue below, the passage
of RFRA cuts in favor of judicial deference on matters of accommodation.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 22:403
1. Politics and accommodation of religion
The crucial question, then, is whether the circumstances of accommodation
of religion make it appropriate for the Court to defer to the outcome reached
in the political arena.'32 A related problem arises when the religious majority
acts to provide exemptions for burdens on itself. Consider, for example, an
ordinance that suspends parking restrictions around churches on Sunday
mornings adopted in a predominantly Catholic town. Does such exemption
deserve the judicial deference that I am suggesting that accommodations of
minority practices ought to get? I think not, for the simple reason (absent facts
suggesting otherwise) that the political process cannot be trusted in such a
context. It does not follow, however, that such an ordinance would be
unconstitutional. There are good secular reasons to support such an ordinance
- for example, the need to control traffic and ensure safe pedestrian access to
church - and the government therefore should be permitted to pursue those
secular ends. That conclusion holds, however, only so long as the government
has a reason apart from the identity of the exemption seeker for denying
similar accommodations to other faiths (or other parties generally) when they
seek them. The analysis of this question could easily collapse into a general
discussion of whether accommodations are good policy in general, or good
constitutional policy. Because part of my aim in this paper has been to avoid
rehashing that general discussion, I will limit my argument here to the
132 In considering whether accommodation of religion shows impermissible favoritism for
religion over non-religion, it is important to be clear about what we mean by accommodation.
As I stated in section I, the notion of accommodation under consideration here includes
"government laws or policies that have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or
facilitating the exercise of, a person's or an institution's religion." McConnell, supra note 5,
at 686. See also Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 13, at 559 n.11.
Like Professor Lupu, I limit my consideration to that government action which is not mandated
by the Free Exercise Clause. See id. See also Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, supra
note 13, at 749-53. But cf McConnell, supra note 5, at 687 (including within his definition of
accommodation government conduct taking account of religion that is mandated by free
exercise, as well as that which is not, but noting that the definitional dispute makes little
practical difference).
Hard cases can arise in circumstances where the political process results in the display
of religious symbols such as creches or menorahs. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). As a general matter, my argument reaches
political exemptions for religion, and thus, like Professor McConnell, I do not include within
the category of accommodation a state practice "that acknowledges or expresses the prevailing
religious sentiments of the community, such as the display of a religious symbol on public
property or the delivery of a prayer at public ceremonial events." McConnell, supra note 5, at
687. Although such practices might be constitutionally defensible, the argument here does not
address them.
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institutional features of courts and politics that might affect our analysis of the
question where the decisionmaking focus ought to be.
It is worth repeating the kind of government action I am considering:
Accommodation includes government conduct that reduces or relieves burdens
on religious exercise, usually by providing an exemption from laws that have
an inhibiting impact on the religious believer. The affirmative case for trusting
the political process in this context is that accommodation, virtually by
definition, protects minority interests in the community. In that situation -
where the political judgment is made that the religious scruples of some
citizens makes it appropriate to exempt them from the otherwise applicable
requirements of law - the differences between judges and political actors do
not justify giving the views of judges precedence. Because courts are subject
to the same constitutional constraints as electorally accountable politicians,
there ought to be some good reason for the views of judges to be given
priority. If there is no real danger of the political process abusing minority
interests, courts are institutionally unnecessary to police the limits of
appropriate accommodation. In short, this is a circumstance in which the
political process can generally be trusted.
33
The objections most commonly made to accommodation of religion by
political actors focus on two primary arguments. First, one might argue that
accommodations prefer religion over non-religion in violation of fundamental
Establishment Clause principles.'3 There is the fear that putting questions of
accommodation on the political table is simply inappropriate in the American
constitutional order; it is outside the bounds of constitutional decisionmaking,
and leads to potential discord or conflict between sects as well as between the
secular and religious.1 35 As Kathleen Sullivan put it, religion is an inappropri-
113 Cf ELY, supra note 99. I do not mean to defend entirely a process-based theory of
constitutional law along the lines proposed by Professor Ely in his famous book. Although
there is much power, particularly explanatory power, in his theory, it has been widely criticized
as providing an inadequate general account of constitutional protection of individual rights. In
the context where the majority has reached out to protect minority rights - and has done so
generally, based upon real differences such as the ones reflected in different religious tenets -
his theory has greater power. In that situation, a court can be more comfortable deferring than
in a situation where it intervenes to reject a majoritarian decision to act (or not to). In the
present context, however, it is not too simple to rely on the majoritarian nature of decisions to
accommodate religion as justifying a lesser judicial role. I will explain why in the text.
'34 See, e.g., Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 13; Lupu, The
Trouble With Accommodation, supra note 13; Tushnet, supra note 11; Mark V. Tushnet, The
Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988). -
135 See, e.g., Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 13, at 596;
Kathleen M. Sullivan, God as a Lobby: The Culture of Disbelief. How American Law and
Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, 61 U. CIE. L. REv. 1655 (1994) (book review); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy]. Cf Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at
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ate basis for public argument, and indeed religious liberty is justifiable only
insofar "as it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral
order."'1
36
Second, there is the fear that leaving questions of accommodation to the
political process will work to the advantage of mainstream religions and the
detriment of minority religions. Unequal treatment of religious sects was one
of the dangers that the Establishment Clause was designed against, and leaving
matters of religion to the political process makes it more likely that political
majorities will favor their own beliefs or beliefs that are comfortable to them.
a. Permissive accommodation, properly understood, does not privilege
religion over non-religion. As for the first objection, it is important to
recognize that accommodation, properly understood, does not intrinsically
favor one religion over another, or affirmatively favor religion at all. As the
Court has stated, the "clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." '37 As
Professor Berg has reminded us, accommodations are permissible because they
relieve burdens on religion rather than create incentives to practice it: "The
government is forbidden, under settled Establishment Clause doctrine, from
teaching any religious doctrine as true or trying to influence citizens to adopt
religious beliefs."'38 That insight is reflected in the Court's doctrine. For
example, it is a settled principle that the government must remain neutral
toward religion - that the government may not take any action either to affirm
or deny the truth of any religious proposition, that it may not reward or
penalize religious conduct, that it may not compel people to pay for religion
through their taxes.'39 It is also true, however, that the neutrality obligation
the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1992) (discussing and criticizing, inter alia, Dean
Sullivan's views on establishment).
136 Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, supra note 135, at 198.
137 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
38 Berg, supra note 16, at 720.
139 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion."). See also Berg, supra note 16, at 720-22. The literature on government
neutrality toward religion is of course voluminous. Perhaps its most prominent exponent is
Professor Laycock. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and
Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 313 (1996); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis
in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841 (1992); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuLL. REV. 993 (1990);
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sometimes permits, or even requires, the government to permit religious
participation in public programs. " Even more to the present point, the Court
has stated clearly that accommodations, properly understood, do not evince
any government favoritism toward religion, but rather government respect for
the need to avoid impinging unnecessarily on religious exercise."' In short,
in cases of true accommodation, the principle that the government may not
favor religion remains unsullied; to the extent that one believes otherwise,
moreover, that is a function of the Court's doctrine whether or not it is political
or judicial actors with the last word.
Yet there is a strong strand in the literature that accommodation harms non-
believers by providing a special benefit to religion. '42 In the Court, moreover,
the objection to preferring religion to non-religion centers on the harm done
to the non-religious person. As Justice Stevens put it in his concurrence in
Douglas Laycock, EqualAccess and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech
by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
It is worth noting that the decision in Everson, which installed into our constitutional law
the famous metaphor of wall of separation, upheld a government program that reimbursed
parents for the cost of bus transportation to private schools, including Catholic ones; the
program did not single out religious schools, and allowing their participation on a neutral basis
was held not to offend the "wall of separation." Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
4o There are numerous subsequent examples (with some exceptions, see, e.g., Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)) of the Court upholding
religious participation in neutral government programs. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Sometimes that participation is required by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Capitol Square Rev. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rectors and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
141 See, e.g., Corporation for the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
142 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999) (expressing the view that legislative accommodations would
likely survive facial Establishment Clause scrutiny); Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong
and the Court Was Right -Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
793, 806 (1998) ("Underprotecting religion presents free exercise problems; overprotecting it
suggests Establishment Clause concerns. Every move raises the danger of discrimination among
sects."); Jed Rubenfeld,Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2347, 2369 (1997) (suggesting that every accommodation of religion raises
establishment issues because it favors religion over nonreligion); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v.
Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 124 (claiming that when government
exempts religious believers from generally applicable laws, it discriminates against those with
nonreligious objections to the laws). Cf Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78
CAL L. REV. 305, 354 (1990) (noting that exemptions confer special benefits on religious
believers); David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995).
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City of Boerne,43 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act "provided the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to non-religion, is forbidden
by the First Amendment."'" Thus there is a powerful sense that singling out
certain believers for special treatment ill treats those who are not granted the
exemption. 4' Professor Sherry put the point provocatively when she summed
up her objection to permissive accommodations with the simple point that,
under a system of accommodation, "Jews lose." '146
In focusing on the human reactions to accommodation, Professor Sherry's
argument contains an important insight. She argues that Jewish traditions are
quite different from the dominant Christian ones in American society, and thus
that Jewish people generally have different reactions to permissive
accommodation of religion from the reactions that can be expected of
Christians. Among the important differences, she says, are the more private
and non-evangelical nature of Judaism in comparison with most forms of
Christianity; she also says that Jewish people are more likely to base their
views of sound public policy exclusively on arguments based on reason in the
Enlightenment tradition, whereas appeals to argument based on faith are more
common among Christians. 14 7 Accepting her description of the dominant
strands of Jewish and Christian thought, it is important to take account of the
real differences in attitudes that might prevail among people of different (or
no) religious beliefs.
In a constitutional regime that presupposes that accommodations of some
sort will occur, however, the important question is whether the harms
described by Professor Sherry will be any greater if accommodations find their
genesis in the legislature or in the courts. There is no reason to assume that
courts are better situated to make those judgments than legislatures; nor is
there any reason to think that those who are burdened by an accommodation
143 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
'44 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985)).
145 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 308, 319 (1991).
"4 Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious
Minorities, 47 DEPAULL. REv. 499, 503 (1998) ("What sorts of political outcomes might we
expect if we allow religious appeals to influence public policy? The answer may be summarized
in two words: Jews lose.").
147 Id. at 507-16. Professor Sherry says that:
What makes a return to pre-Enlightenment faith problematic, however, is that a reliance
on faith rather than reason is quintessentially Christian. Modem American Judaism -
especially Reform Judaism, but also Conservative Judaism (which together account for
more than ninety percent of American Jews) - has so incorporated Enlightenment ideals
that it has become largely a religion of reason.
Id. at 511.
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will feel better about it if the decision comes from a judge rather than from
popularly accountable officials. One might suppose that those who are
unhappy with the outcome - whether they were for or against the
accommodation - will find it more acceptable precisely because they had a
say, and because they can hold the decisionmakers accountable.
Taking Professor Sherry's argument on its own terms, moreover, the
question is really one of determining whether the harm done by
accommodation to non-believers is greater or more important than the harm
done to believers from the failure to grant the accommodation. On the merits
of that question, one might argue that legislative accommodation of religion
imposes no substantial real-world harm or obligations on other actors. The
impact upon others from being required to respect the religious views of one
who is granted an accommodation is, as Professor Sherry notes, largely
psychic. Non-believers doubtless might feel slight or offense,148 but the
message being sent is not one of exclusion but of tolerance and equal
respect.'49 Moreover, we are bound all the time in our society to suffer
frustrations from not having our way in matters of public policy. The staunch
Republican (or Democrat) doubtless feels great psychic harm when the other
party is in control of one or another part of the government. We are expected
to understand, however, that such frustrations are part of living in a pluralistic
society - even though the First Amendment prohibits us from being ill-treated
on account of our political beliefs. 5 ' The law distinguishes, in other words,
between the frustration we feel at not getting our way - or feeling as though
we are not being as highly valued by the government on account of our
partisan beliefs - and being treated differently by the government on those
grounds. Thus, one might reasonably argue, religion is not unique in exciting
feelings of frustration and isolation when the government acts in a way
contrary to your own outlook.
Whether or not these arguments are persuasive, the important question for
present purposes is who will make the judgments about human nature, about
the likely reaction to accommodations by non-believers, about how best to
balance the complex factors that one must consider in drawing the lines. 51 The
141 See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 365 (1991).
149 See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 101-03.
15o See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O'Hare Truck
Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62
(1990); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
' In light of my arguments in the text, I am unpersuaded by Professor Lupu's argument that
courts not only should be the preferred locus for government decisions to accommodate
religion, but that political actors should ipsofacto be disqualified from considering questions
of accommodation. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 13, at 600-
07. See also Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, supra note 13, at 759-63 (discussing and
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reasons why we might be expected to tolerate accommodation even when it
does us no immediate good are accessible to believers and non-believers alike,
as are the counter-arguments. Legislatures, and the public square generally,
are the places where differences like these are generally resolved.'52
Perhaps the proper role of religion and its accommodation, however, is
uniquely ill-suited for resolution in the public square. Religion is unique, the
argument goes, and singled out in the First Amendment as an impermissible
ground for government treatment of people. And as Dean Sullivan has
emphasized, differences in religious beliefs have historically led to civil strife
and even war.'53 Although there is certainly power in this view, in the context
of accommodation its force is nonetheless muted. The first problem is that the
argument addresses the government generally, and not simply political actors.
The same sense of harm and isolation produced by legislative exemptions
exists when exemptions are judicially imposed." And the same difficulty of
the tyranny of the majority exists when the government actors at issue are
judges rather than legislators. Thus the uniqueness of religion,, and the harm
done by exemptions, is a powerful argument against just that: exemptions,
whether judicially or politically mandated. As Professor Marshall said in
objecting to judicially imposed exemptions, "[giranting exemptions only to
religious claimants promotes its own form of inequality: a constitutional
criticizing what he calls the "non-justiciability thesis" for questions of free exercise
accommodation). Although Professor Lupu describes features of courts that might make them
good at resolving legal questions, see id., his argument does not recognize that many of the
predictive judgments about human reactions are not inherently judicial in nature. More
fundamentally, he does not recognize that in cases of accommodation, there is good reason to
trust the outcome of the democratic process and thus less reason to impose the views of
unaccountable judges on the society as a whole.
On the question of legislative versus judicial competence in these matters, it is important
to consider Professor Volokh's powerful argument for judicial development, in a common law
model, of the law of exemptions. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). Among the many points he makes is that the
flexibility provided by case-by-case adjudication is better suited to the particular context of
accommodation. Professor Volokh's argument is explicitly based, however, on the premise that
the common law decisions of courts are subject to legislative amendment so that the last word
lies with democratically accountable officials. See id. at 1469-7 1. He is skeptical, however,
of the constitutionality of any regime which grants exemptions on religious grounds without
also providing similar benefits to others who object on non-religiously based grounds of
conscience. See id. at 1492-94.
12 See generally WALDRON, supra note 52 (developing an argument that we should prefer
legislation, with all its tumult and messiness, to judicial supremacy); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) (developing argument that legislatures are the preferred locus in
a democracy to resolve fundamental disagreements).
153 See generally Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, supra note 135.
" I shall consider presently whether the differences between political actors and judicial
actors in this context cut against permitting legislative exemptions. See infra section Il.B. 1.b.
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preference for religious over non-religious belief systems."'155 As we have
seen, however, constitutional doctrine has not, and is not likely to, insist that
accommodation only be permitted insofar as the Free Exercise Clause requires
it. The question here is whether courts or legislatures will draw the necessary
lines.
The fact still remains, however, that religion as a subject of widespread
political debate is a subject that has proven divisive in history. And political
majorities in this country have shown themselves capable of intolerance on
matters of religion.'56 There is, moreover, a rich literature on the appropriate
place of religion in public discourse.' Again, however, my argument for
deference is not one that applies generally to government action that advances
religion for its own sake. Instead, the deference I suggest is limited to cases
of accommodation of religion, in which by definition the community at large
makes the judgment that the religious sensibilities of some will be respected." 8
It is nonetheless possible that open acknowledgment of the legitimacy of
that political choice might lead to greater, and more deleterious in some sense,
participation of religion in public policy; that is a predictive judgment,
however, about which it seems to me any confident assessment is premature.
Taking up that speculation, the next part of this article will sketch the
performance of the political process in accommodating religion in recent years
and argue that the record provides more reason for optimism if we look to
political actors than if we look to judges.
b. Political accommodation protects minority religions at least as well as
judicial accommodation. The next objection to political accommodation of
religion is that it will inevitably favor majority religions and disfavor minority
ones. Even defenders of political accommodation have sometimes conceded
this point, and it appears to have intuitive appeal. 9 In Smith, the Court
153 See Marshall, supra note 145, at 319.
156 See, e.g., CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988);
LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987); DIANE
RAvrrCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS (1974).
157 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993); JOHN H. GARVEY,
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1997); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC
REASONS (1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGioUs CONVICrIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL
TRADITION OFAMERICAN CONSTTUTIONALISM (1993). A few citations of leading books cannot
possibly do justice, of course, to the enormous literature on the proper role of religion in
political life.
15' As a matter of prudence the political process ought to frame its debates in terms that are
accessible to non-believers. See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 157, at 151-
64. It seems reasonable to think that accommodations will be more acceptable to those who do
not benefit from them if they are explained and justified in terms that will appeal to the body
politic and not just believers.
'59 See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3.
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asserted, "[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are
not widely engaged in.""Iw And Professor McConnell has conceded that
"[laws that impinge upon the religious practices of larger or more prominent
faiths will be noticed and remedied. When the laws impinge upon the practice
of smaller groups, legislators will not even notice, and may not care even if
they do notice."'
161
Experience both before and after the decision in Smith shows, however, that
the intuition that minority religions are badly off in the political process
appears to be mistaken. And even if thatproposition is not certainly true, there
seems to be little room for disagreement on the point that the political process
has, by and large, been much more hospitable to the interests of minority
religions than has the Supreme Court. I will consider these points in turn.
The most prominent example of the political process's solicitude for religion
without regard to its mainstream status is the passage of RFRA.' 62 In the wake
of Smith, a broad coalition - even a consensus - emerged that it would be
appropriate to pass a statute to protect religious liberty more broadly than the
Court had interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require.'63 The product was
RFRA, which generally provided that government action imposing a
substantial burden on free exercise was invalid unless it was narrowly tailored
and supported by a compelling interest.164
As commentators have noted, RFRA powerfully reflects the political
process acting to protect minority religions.165 Professor Rubenfeld captured
the point of RFRA as follows: "RFRA sought to eradicate state favoritism of
majority religious practices. It did so, moreover, in the name of religious
freedom, of minority religious practices, and of the equal respect due to all
"6 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
161 McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 13, at 1136. See also Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VIL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1994) (assuming that majority religious practices are
better treated in the political process than minority religions); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants
of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (stating that "[tihe majority's deeply held beliefs
will normally be reflected in legislation without an exemption.").
62 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-
4 (1994).
63 The vote on RFRA was unanimous in the House; in the Senate it passed by a vote of 97-
3. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton signs boost for religious freedom/Liberals, conservatives back
new law, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2130296.
'64 See RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (1994).
65 See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 39, 91 (1995) (stating that
"RFRA demonstrates that contemporary American values support the protection of religiously
motivated conduct even from laws of general application"); Rubenfeld, supra note 142, at 2358.
2000 / PRIMACY OF POLITICAL ACTORS
religions. ' '66 One can argue over whether it is a good idea in policy to impose
such a broad exemption as a general matter, 67 and over whether RFRA's
exemption is constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 168 And of course
the Court struck down the statute as it applied to the States in City of
Boeme. 69 It seems clear, however, that RFRA rebukes the idea that adherents
of majority faiths will act only to protect their own. On the contrary, RFRA,
as well as its state counterparts,' 70 reach out broadly to protect religious
freedom from unnecessary burdens regardless of how non-mainstream a
particular faith may be.
' Rubenfeld, supra note 142, at 2387.
167 For an argument cataloguing the real world benefits of RFRA and similar legislation, see
Thomas C. Berg, State and Federal Religious Liberty Legislation: Is it Necessary? Is it
Constitutional? Is it Good Policy? The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and
Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (1999). For a contrary assessment of the
performance of RFRA, see Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrFLE ROCK L.J. 575
(1998). For a thorough attack, mainly on policy grounds, on religious freedom legislation, see
Lupu, supra note 132.
168 For attacks on RFRA, and broad legislative accommodations, as establishment, see, e.g.,
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring ); Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 79 (1997); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
457-58 (1994); Marcia Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 227, 242 (1995); Aurora R. Bearse, Note, RFRA: Is it Necessary? Is it Proper?, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 1045 (1998); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No RFRAFAllowed: The Status of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1998). For a careful and skeptical evaluation, see Scott C.
Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73
Tnx. L. REV. 247 (1994). See also Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious
Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LrTTLE ROCK L.J. 715 (1998) (arguing that RFRA is
constitutional as applied to the federal government); Erwin Chemerinsky, Do State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts Violate the Establishment Clause or Separation of Powers?, 32 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 645 (1999) (defending the constitutionality of state RFRAs).
'69 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that RFRA was not properly within the power of
Congress, pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see U.S. CONST., amend. XIV,
§ 5, to enforce the incorporated First Amendment against the States.
Because the decision in City of Boerne (and its rationale) reached only the statute's
constitutionality as it applied to the States, it is an open question whether RFRA, in its
continuing application to the federal government, violates the Establishment Clause. Justice
Stevens believes that it does. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
One court of appeals has rejected such a challenge. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.
1998).
17 See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions - A Research
Agenda With Test Suites, 21 CARDoZO L. REV. 595,597 n.2 (1999) (gathering state RFRAs).
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In addition to broad laws like RFRA, the political process has also shown
itself to be hospitable to the need to accommodate religion, even minority
religions, more narrowly.' There is no need to catalogue anew this story.
As Dean Choper has shown, there are any number of examples of legislative
bodies, both state and federal, reaching out to protect minority religions from
disparate impacts without there having been any constitutional compulsion to
do so.'72 That is not to say that the record of accommodation has been
uniform; of course, it has not, and nor should it have been. Absent compulsion
of the Free Exercise Clause, a regime of permissive accommodations takes as
a possibility that sometimes accommodations will not be granted. 173 Thus,
notwithstanding federal law to the contrary, a State might well conclude that
it is more important to have an extremely stringent anti-drug regime than it is
to exempt the religious use of peyote.'74 Apart from the peyote example - as
to which there do not seem to be many good arguments against an exemption
- one can readily imagine situations in which the government might
reasonably decide not to accommodate religious sensibilities. There is a limit
in costs and safety after which the religious claimant might reasonably be
asked to yield.
Regardless of what one thinks about the legislative record of
accommodation, the record in courts gives no reason for partisans of
exemptions to prefer judges. In the first place, notwithstanding rhetoric to the
contrary prior to Smith, the Court rarely came through with ringing protections
for religious freedom, particularly for non-mainstream and untraditional
sects. '75 In fact, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause requires
" I do not wish to join the interesting debate over whether broad or narrow statutory
protection of religious liberty is preferable. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Symposium, The
New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They are Wrong, 21 CARDOZOL. REv.
415 (1999). For my purposes, the point here is that the legislative process has shown itself
hospitable to legitimate demands for religious freedom, regardless of whether the religion in
question is minority or mainstream.
172 See Jesse H. Choper, Brennan Center Symposium on Constitutional Law: Comments on
Stephen Carter's Lecture, 87 CAuF. L. REV. 1087, 1089-90 (1999) (gathering and discussing
examples); CHOPER, supra note 3, at 112-13. See also Volokh, supra note 170, at 596-99.
173 As I will argue below, however, the importance of ensuring that government extends
exemptions without invidiously discriminating between religions justifies judicial supervision
of denials of exemptions.
174 In the Smith litigation, Oregon originally determined on certification from the Supreme
Court, see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), that
its drug laws applied to religious use of peyote. See Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Ore. 68,
763 P.2d 146 (1988). After the Supreme Court's second decision - the one which excited the
last 10 years of legislation and scholarship on religious freedom - the State changed its mind
and enacted a statutory exemption for peyote use. See OR. REV. STAT. 475.992(5) (1991).
175 See Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST.
COMMENTARY 147, 147 (1987) (noting the Court's practice of failing to require exemptions
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exemptions on only five occasions. 7 6  Four of those cases involved
Sabbatarians whose practices did not seem terribly threatening - not like
bigamy, for example.' 77 And in Yoder, the fifth case, the Court's rhetoric in
tribute to the Amish way of life was almost embarrassing.' Against these
five cases stand many more in which the Court denied claims of free exercise
exemption. 7 9
even in cases where strict scrutiny applied); Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause,
supra note 13, at 560 (noting Court's practice of rejecting free exercise claims); McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 13, at 1110 (noting paucity of successful free exercise
claims); Steinberg, supra note 142, at 248-50 (noting the Court's pattern of refusing to grant
free exercise exemptions prior to Smith); Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, supra note
135, at 215 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has overwhelmingly rejected free exercise
exemption claims").
176 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (upholding claim
that public benefits could not be denied on account of individual's refusal to work on certain
days for religious reasons); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(same); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (same); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403-10 (1963) (same).
On one occasion since Smith, the Court has struck down a law on free exercise grounds.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). There,
the Court concluded that city ordinances barring certain forms of animal sacrifice were targeted
at the Church of Santeria and were therefore unconstitutional under the free exercise doctrine
explained in Smith.
177 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (rejecting free exercise claim by
Mormon who claimed that it was his religious duty to have multiple spouses).
178 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972) ("Indeed, the Amish
communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the
'sturdy yeoman' who would form the basis of what he considered as the ideal of a democratic
society. Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we profess to admire
and encourage.") (footnote omitted). Even the Amish did not fare so well in their next go round
before the Court, in which the Court rejected a religious freedom claim of exemption from the
social security system. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-61 (1982).
179 See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(holding that California need not exempt a religious organization's sales of religious materials
from the state's sales and use taxes); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)
(refusing to exempt Muslim inmates from prison work rules, even though these rules prevented
the inmates from attending obligatory prayer services); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986) (refusing to exempt an Orthodox Jewish officer from Air Force dress regulations that
prevented the officer from wearing his yarmulke indoors); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (refusing to exempt religious employees from
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(refusing to exempt an Amish employer from obligations imposed by the social security
system). See also Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
(refusing to recognize the deductibility under the Internal Revenue Code of certain fees paid to
the Church of Scientology because the money was not a religious donation but was instead for
goods and services rendered); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(upholding denial of tax exemption on grounds of racial discrimination, despite the claim that
the University's discriminatory rules were religiously-grounded). See generally Steinberg,
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Thus, it is fair to say that the Court has been less than aggressive in
protecting religious freedom in the form of mandating exemptions.' The
legislative record becomes even better when we consider the reaction to
several of the decisions declining to mandate exemptions. As I have already
noted, after Smith, the State of Oregon provided a legislative exemption for
religious peyote use. "' And the reaction to a number of leading cases in which
the Supreme Court rejected free exercise claims was similar. After the Court
declined to mandate an exemption from the Air Force's uniform regulations
for an Orthodox Jewish officer who wished to wear a yarmulke while on
duty, ' 2 Congress passed a statute providing an exemption.'83 Although the
Court held in United States v. Lee' that the Amish did not have a free
exercise right to opt out of the social security system, Congress later enacted
a general exemption for employers and employees opposed to participation in
social security on religious grounds.' After the decision denying the free
exercise claim in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,1
8 6
the Executive Branch decided to reroute the road that was at issue so as not to
impinge upon sacred Native American lands.'87 Moreover, as Dean Choper
points out, the exemption from compulsory attendance laws that was ordered
as a matter of free exercise in Yoder was already available in most States; and
the exemption that was denied as a matter of free exercise in Smith was
provided by about half the States and the federal government.' These are
examples not only of accommodation of religion, but of non-mainstream,
minority religious practices.
It might well be that the anecdotal evidence recounted here is insufficient
to establish that legislatures are prone to accommodate legitimate demands for
religious exemptions. The point here, however, is a comparative one -
whether legislatures or courts are more open to accommodation of religion,
particularly of non-mainstream religious practices. The evidence suggests that
there is no reason to suppose that legislatures are less responsive than courts
in accommodating non-mainstream religious practices. Indeed, we might
supra note 142, at 248-50 (gathering materials).
80 As I discussed in section I, infra, moreover, the Court has struck down any number of
attempted exemptions as impermissible establishments.
18' See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
282 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
283 See Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774) (allowing
service members to wear religious garb subject to exceptions).
1- 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
115 See 26 U.S.C. § 3127 (2000).
86 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
187 See Choper, supra note 172, at 1089 (describing executive decision to reroute road to
accommodate religious objections).
"88 See id. at 1089-90.
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reasonably expect, as the anecdotal evidence suggests, that legislatures will be
more responsive. Courts do not generally have the power to order an
exemption unless the Free Exercise Clause demands one, but legislatures do
have that power. Under current free exercise doctrine - which only rarely
requires exemptions - it would be quite surprising if the situation were
otherwise.
To sum, the experience with legislative accommodation indicates that we
have reason to be confident that majoritarian institutions can deal fairly and
prudently with legitimate demands for accommodation of religious exercise,
including practices engaged in by minority religions. The passage of general
laws protecting religious exercise like RFRA and its state law counterparts is
particularly powerful evidence of the legislative process's ability to provide
for situations beyond the familiar practices of Christianity or other common
religions. And there is evidence that more narrow accommodation of non-
mainstream religions is possible, even normal, at the legislative level. Thus,
the intuitively powerful objection to legislative accommodation based upon
fear of majority religions tending to their own interests at the expense of others
does not withstand analysis.
3. The appropriate scope ofjudicial scrutiny
Our capacity to trust legislatures in matters of accommodation is, of course,
contingent upon a lack of evidence of discrimination among religions. In light
of the unquestioned proposition that the First Amendment does not permit the
government to pick and choose which religions it will favor on grounds related
in any way to the content of their religious doctrines or beliefs,'89 it is
important in dealing with decisions to accommodate to ensure that invidious
discrimination is not at work.
It is established that an array of constitutional doctrines stand ready to
condemn any government distinctions between religions except on neutral
grounds. Such discrimination violates the Establishment Clause"9 and the
Free Exercise Clause, 9' and it sometimes violates the Speech Clause'92 and the
Equal Protection Clause.'93 Simply put, there is no place for non-neutral
'89 Citations for this point should not be necessary. I will just note that the entire basis for
the oft-criticized decision in Smith is the necessity of neutral government treatment of religion.
For the Smith Court, lack of neutrality is just about the definition of a free exercise violation.
'99 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
'9' See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
"9 See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
193 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (dictum); Peyote Way Church of
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distinctions between religions.
That is not to say, however, that the government must always treat all
religions the same. The norm against discrimination reaches only invidious
discrimination. Thus it is no violation to ban the use of peyote along with
other illicit drugs, despite the heavy practical impact of such a ban on the
Native American Church. 94 That is so despite the fact that the sacramental
practices of other religions do not suffer commensurate harm from other
regulations. If there is reason to believe, however, that neutral legislative
action in fact is a mask for intentionally disparate treatment, then the Court
does (and should) stand ready to intervene. The treatment of the Church of the
Santeria by the City of Hialeah, Florida, is the perfect example of this.'
The task of distinguishing between intentional government discrimination
among religions and simple disparate impacts knows familiar analogues in
constitutional law. For one example, consider standard equal protection
doctrine, in which the distinction between intentional discrimination and
disparate impact is foundational. " For another, consider symbolic expression.
If the government acts to suppress conduct because of the message it
expresses, the government must satisfy the "most exacting" First Amendment
scrutiny;'97 but if the government regulation is neutral and unrelated to the
content of the symbolic expression, the government need only satisfy a far less
demanding standard of review.'98 In each situation, the Court has developed
God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (dictum). See also John H. Garvey,
Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 193 (finding an equality
principle inherent in the Establishment Clause); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion,
Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REv. 739, 741-55 (1986) (reading
the Establishment Clause to embody the principle of "equal religious liberty"); Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 13, at 586-87 (same); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 311 (1986) (elaborating a similar argument). But
cf. Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 1049, 1104 (1996) (arguing
that equal protection norms cut against providing protections for religious employers who wish
to discriminate on the basis of religion and wondering what "is so special about religious
freedoms that religious employers are permitted to exceed the limits of tolerance set for all
others?").
"94 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
'95 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(striking down under the Free Exercise Clause ordinances against certain animal sacrifices,
which while neutral on their face had the purpose of impinging upon the religious rites of the
Church of the Santeria).
'96 See Personnel Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
'97 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,412 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988)).
'9' See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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the law to take account of the particular context. In the context of
accommodation of religion, the need to ensure equality and neutrality of
treatment makes it appropriate for the Court to step in once such a showing has
been made.' 99 Absent a finding of disparate treatment of meaningfully
indistinguishable cases, however, there is no need for the Court to interfere.
The last point would benefit from some further explanation. The Court has
sometimes invalidated legislative accommodations on the ground that they are
not broad enough. For example, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet,200 the Court struck down a New York State law that
permitted the members of the Satmar Hasidim, an insular orthodox sect of
Judaism, to establish a public school district coterminous with the geographic
area in which their adherents lived.2°' Part of the Court's reasoning rested on
the lack of any assurance that the State would treat favorably future requests
for similar accommodations by other religious groups or non-religious
groups.2 2 As Justice Souter put it in his majority opinion, "the fact that this
school district was created by a special and unusual Act of the legislature also
gives reason for concern whether the benefit received by the Satmar
community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other religious
(and nonreligious) groups. 20 3 The lack of any assurance that the government
would heed the next call for accommodation in similar circumstances thus led
the Court to find an establishment in the first accommodation. A similar
impulse lay behind the Court's decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,2°
where Connecticut had provided an exemption for some religions - those
which observed a Sabbath - but not for all.
Ordinarily, of course, the government is permitted to tackle problems
without also assuring that "all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none
at all." 205 The government is normally permitted to regulate "one step at a
time," with its obligation being to refrain from engaging in "invidious
discrimination." 2°6 As I have noted, however, in the Establishment Clause
' See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 112-13.
200 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1994).
211 The point of the legislative accommodation (whether it was of religion or culture, see id.
at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) was to permit disabled Satmar children to take advantage of
publicly-funded special education programs. Under the then-current doctrine (see Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), both
overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)), special education services could not be
provided in a religious school.
202 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702.
203 Id.
204 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
205 See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
206 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). See also FCC v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). The Court's classic statement in
Williamson bears quoting at length:
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context the Court has generally taken a far different approach. The Court has
repeatedly insisted that the breadth of a government exemption is important in
determining its constitutionality. As Justice Brennan put it in Texas Monthly,
if a statutory benefit "is confined to religious organizations," it is
unconstitutional on that ground alone; 2°7 only if the "benefits derived by
religious organizations flow[] to a large number of nonreligious groups as
well" can an exemption program be justified. 28 Thus the Court's doctrine
rejects the one-step-at-a-time approach.
In situations of accommodation of religion, however, the lack of breadth of
an exemption should not count decisively against its constitutionality. In the
first place, the Court in its own conduct - as state actors bound by the First
Amendment - does not adhere to the principle that exemptions are permissible
only if they are provided up front in every situation in which they might be
sought. Of course, because courts decide cases as they come, it would be quite
odd for judges to order as part of a free exercise exemption not only that
Amish children should be exempted from compulsory attendance laws but that
other children of farmers who needed their labor must be as well. To put the
point a little differently, it did not violate the Establishment Clause for the
decision in Yoder to reach only the situation before the Court.
The same should be true of legislative accommodations. As Professor
McConnell has noted, "[i]t is only natural for legislatures to address free
exercise problems as they arise. ' 209 In striking down the New York law
creating the school district at issue in Grumet, however, the Court emphasized
that it "ha[d] no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a
school district of its own will receive one."21 Thus the Court required New
York not only to agree that others who are similarly situated to the Satmars
will get similar treatment in the future, but that it also demonstrate its bona
fides by anticipating and providing such accommodations here and now -
regardless of whether calls for similar accommodation have been heard from
anyone.2 ' It is unnecessary for the Court to insist on such assurances in order
to uphold specific accommodations.
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,
requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy
there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
further than the invidious discrimination.
Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted).
207 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
208 id.
209 McConnell, supra note 5, at 707.
210 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
211 See id. at 702-05.
2000 / PRIMACY OF POLITICAL ACTORS
If a similarly situated group seeks accommodation in the future, the Court
has readily at hand the tools to deal with discriminatory treatment when the
need arises. Although the Court in Grumet noted that it does not have the
power to insist that a legislature pass a law providing an accommodation in the
future, 212 it is standard doctrine that the Court has the power to strike down the
prior government conduct as non-neutral once that fact has been established
in the real world.13 To hold otherwise "would effectively insulate
underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge.21 4 In light of this
general approach, it is difficult to see why insufficient breadth should doom
an accommodation at the outset.15
Although neutrality among religions is required, one should not
underestimate the complexity of determining just what it means for a future
claimant to be "similarly situated" to one who received a prior
accommodation. As Dean Choper has argued, it is necessary that the Court
confront this difficulty with common sense and a recognition that "the
dynamics of the political process ... and the wide diversity of religious beliefs
in our society makes it inevitable that government accommodations will result
in some degree of differential treatment of religious faiths."2 6 While different
treatment of religious practices that cannot be meaningfully distinguished from
one another should not be tolerated, 17 "[t]he requirement of denominational
neutrality must.., be applied realistically. '218 As Professor McConnell has
argued, "[n]ot all religious practices have the same impact on government
policy, and too exacting a requirement of equal treatment would likely
discourage sensible and beneficial accommodations."
'219
212 See id. at 703.
113 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 7-8 (striking down a tax exemption for religious
publications at the behest of a non-religious publication which did not receive the same benefit);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979).
214 Ragland, 481 U.S. at 227. Once the Court has found the prior accommodation
unconstitutional, however, it has acknowledged that it is up to the State to decide "whether the
correct response as a matter of state law to a finding that a state tax exemption is
unconstitutional is to eliminate the exemption, to curtail it, to broaden it, or to invalidate the tax
altogether." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8. Professor McConnell has argued that the proper
course in such a situation is to extend the accommodation to the denied group under the Free
Exercise Clause. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 708.
215 See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 110-13 (arguing that insufficient breadth should not be fatal
to an accommodation absent reason to believe that it is actually motivated by a lack of
neutrality).
216 Id. at 113.
217 See id. at 113-33 (analyzing this complex inquiry).
218 McConnell, supra note 5, at 707.
219 Id.
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m. CONCLUSION
For those who believe that it is never appropriate for the government to
single out religion, questions of accommodation are not difficult. But "deeply
rooted aspects of our constitutional tradition and religion clause jurisprudence"
hold that government does not "favor religion over non-religion" when it
accommodates religion.220 In cases of true accommodation, the reasons why
we are suspicious of political power and reliant on judicial power dissipate.
Judges are state actors just like legislators. And judges have shown themselves
able to treat legislative power with greater suspicion than is warranted, and
judicial power with more confidence than is warranted. In light of these
points, if we step back and survey the terrain, we see that there is good reason
for judges to defer to political accommodations of religion. Those reasons go
away if discrimination is afoot; but courts can stand ready to intervene if such
situations develop. Accommodation of religion makes it inevitable that the
government sometimes will treat religion differently from non-religion, and
that is true whether or not the final word is spoken by judges or legislators.
220 See Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Protections of Religious Liberty and the Establishment
Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 539, 543 (1999).
